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I 
n 2004 Thailand began to implement the Financial Sector 
Master Plan (FSMP), a long-term reform program aimed at 
creating a more efficient, transparent, and internationally com-
petitive financial sector that can serve a larger proportion of the 
Thai population.  With the first phase of the FSMP completed 
in 2009, Thailand announced that a second phase of financial 
sector reforms will begin in 2010.  This Asia Focus report pro-
vides an overview of the FSMP’s development, highlights key 
reform measures completed under Phase I, and describes meas-
ures proposed under Phase II and some of the challenges regu-
latory authorities may face during implementation. 
Development of the FSMP
1 
Regulators in Thailand began to consider the need for systemic 
reform after recognizing that weaknesses inherent in the finan-
cial system had intensified the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, 
spawning a banking crisis in addition to the currency crisis.  
Regulators’ immediate focus was on short-term emergency 
measures to contain the crisis and stabilize the financial system, 
including closing more than 50 insolvent financial institutions, 
recapitalizing viable institutions, and establishing debt restruc-
turing mechanisms.  By 2000, signs of stability had begun to 
return to the banking sector, and by the following year banks 
had begun to return to profitability.  These developments al-
lowed regulators to turn their attention to formulating a longer 
term, comprehensive reform program. 
Initially, the focus of these reforms was broad and encompassed 
all financial markets and their governing supervisory frame-
work.  Regulators sought specifically to determine the types of 
financial services that the Thai economy required, the types of 
institutions that could best provide these services, and the ap-
propriate regulatory structure to govern the institutions.  How-
ever, recognizing the dominant role that commercial banks 
played in Thailand’s financial system, and to avoid overlap 
with separate plans for capital market reform also under consid-
eration, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) eventually narrowed the 
scope of the reforms to focus primarily on deposit-taking insti-
tutions under its supervision.
2  At the same time, the BOT ex-
panded the reform’s objectives to include the extension of fi-
nancial services to financially underserved low-income house-
holds and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
3 
In early 2002, the BOT formed a committee to formulate and 
finalize a master plan for reforms, the FSMP.  The committee—
including representatives from financial regulatory agencies, 
financial institutions, consumer groups, academia, and the gen-
eral public—synthesized earlier reform proposals with the re-
sults of two surveys conducted by external consultants.  The 
first survey measured the household and corporate sectors’ 
level of satisfaction with financial services and sought to iden-
tify underserved customer groups.  The second survey bench-
marked Thailand’s financial system with international best 
practices to determine reform options that would best suit Thai-
land’s needs.  These surveys yielded three key findings:  
 Substantial inadequacies in the provision of financial ser-
vices—notably credit, but also deposit services—to rural 
and urban low-income households and to SMEs.
4 
 Fragmentation of the financial sector amongst a number of 
smaller financial institutions and a few larger institutions 
unable to achieve benefits of scale, which resulted in rela-
tively low productivity and weaker risk management.   
 Structural elements of the financial system that appeared to 
adversely affect performance, such as weak information 
databases, inadequate creditor protection, and regulations 
that restricted competition.
5 
To address these findings, in 2003 the committee proposed 
three broad sets of reform measures for inclusion in the final 
FSMP that aimed to: (i) increase financial sector efficiency; (ii) 
broaden general access to financial services; and (iii) improve 
consumer protection and transparency.  Because of the wide 
scope of these measures, regulators decided upon a three-phase 
implementation of the FSMP to begin in 2004.  The FSMP’s 
staged implementation is intended to create a dynamic reform 
process that allows for interim reviews of measures already 
implemented and revisions to measures yet to be implemented.  
Phase II is scheduled to begin during the second half of 2010, 
with Phase III sometime after 2014. 
FSMP Phase I (2004-2009) 
Increase Efficiency of the Financial Sector 
At the heart of Phase I was a set of measures to increase the 
efficiency of the financial sector.  Key to this effort was an 
overhaul of the commercial bank licensing system.  Prior to the 
FSMP, regulators issued multiple types of licenses to a large 
number of financial institutions that provided many of the same 
services to customers.  The BOT also restricted the operations 
of foreign banks and strictly limited the number of new domes-
tic and foreign market entrants.
6  The BOT’s recognition that 
this system restricted competition and allowed for regulatory 
arbitrage led to the need for increased efficiency.
7  The revised 
regime simplified the licensing system by reducing the number 
of license types to four, based on an institution’s size and na-
tionality (Figure 1).  Financial institutions whose license types 
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alone license or obtain a new license through a merger with 
another institution.   
The new licensing system was codified under the 2008 Finan-
cial Institutions Business Act (FIBA), which replaced more than 
a dozen existing laws governing financial institutions’ business 
and consolidated the governance of these institutions under a 
single law.  As a result of these legal changes, the statutory ceil-
ing on foreign investment in Thai commercial banks was raised 
to 49% from 25%, and the limit on foreign directors was in-
creased to one-half from one-quarter of total directors.
8  The 
FIBA also clarified the BOT’s responsibility as the sole regula-
tor of financial institutions and empowered the central bank to 
conduct consolidated supervision over financial conglomer-
ates.
9  The central bank’s position was further strengthened by a 
2008 revision to the Bank of Thailand Act which ensured the 
BOT’s autonomy and independence from the government. 
Reorganization under the new licensing regime and the FIBA 
was bolstered by the BOT’s “one presence” policy, which lim-
ited financial conglomerates to a single licensed deposit taking 
entity and encouraged mergers.
10  To further encourage consoli-
dation under the one presence policy, the Thai government also 
relaxed tax regulations that apply to financial institution merg-
ers and reduced fees on land transfers that resulted from merg-
ers.  As a result of the new licensing regime and the one pres-
ence policy, the number of licensed financial institutions has 
fallen by more than half, to 38 as of March 2010 from 83 in 
December 2003 (Figure 2).
11   During roughly this same period, 
the average commercial bank asset size has grown by nearly 
50%, to THB 324.3 billion (USD 10 billion) from THB 220 
billion (USD 6.8 billion).
12   Foreign participation in Thailand’s 
banking sector also increased, and a number of foreign banks 
have purchased substantial holdings in domestic commercial 
banks.
13  Foreign banks’ share of total commercial bank assets 
has also grown, to 14.0% as of January 2010 from 10.8% as of 
January 2004 according to BOT data. 
Broaden General Access to Financial Services 
A second set of measures under Phase I of the FSMP focused 
on broadening access to financial services among underbanked 
households and small enterprises.  Thai financial authorities 
considered microfinance to be one conduit for the provision of 
financial services to rural low-income communities, and in 
2003 the Ministry of Finance (MOF) established a committee 
on Microfinance System Development to consider and promote 
options for grass-roots financing.  Government-owned special 
financial institutions (SFIs) such as the Government Savings 
Bank and the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Coopera-
tives have also started to play a greater role in microfinance 
activities. 
To further encourage the extension of credit to underserved 
sectors, in February 2006 the BOT incentivized lending to these 
sectors by amending guidance on banks’ assignment of risk 
weights to certain types of loans.  The revised guidance allowed 
banks to assign lower risk weights to fully collateralized mort-
gage loans of up to THB 3 million (USD 92,400), fully collater-
alized SME loans of up to THB 50 million (USD 1.5 million) 
and uncollateralized retail loans up to THB 100,000 (USD 
3,000).
14  These revisions required banks to reserve less capital 
to protect against future losses on these loans, freeing funds for 
use in extending additional credit. 
Improve Depositor and Consumer Protection and Transpar-
ency 
The most significant measure to improve consumer protection 
under Phase I of the FSMP was the replacement of Thailand’s 
blanket deposit guarantee system with a limited deposit guaran-
tee.  The new system is overseen by a newly created Deposit 
Protection Agency (DPA), which all commercial banks are re-
quired to join as members.
15 Beginning August 2011, the blan-
ket deposit guarantee will be phased out over a five-year period, 
and the insured amount will be reduced incrementally each year 
through August 2015, when the amount will be limited to one 
million baht (USD 30,800).
16   The new system aims to remove 
an element of moral hazard introduced by the blanket guaran-
tee, increase market discipline on banks, and minimize the pub-
lic cost of the deposit insurance system. 
The BOT also implemented measures to increase the transpar-
ency of products and services by requiring banks to post on 
their websites the daily deposit rates paid on savings and time 
Figure 2: Financial Institution Consolidation (2003-2009) 
Institution Type  Dec-03  Mar-10 
Commercial Banks  31  32 
 -- Domestically Registered  13  16 
     -- Commercial Bank  n.a.  14 
     -- Retail Bank  n.a.  2 
 -- Foreign Bank Branch  18  15 
 -- Foreign Bank Subsidiary  n.a.  1 
International Banking Facilities (IBFs)  29  n.a. 
Finance Companies  18  3 
Credit Foncier Companies  5  3 
TOTAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
83  38 
Source: Bank of Thailand and Economist Intelligence Unit 
Figure 1: Thai Commercial Bank Licensing System deposits as well as interest rates charged on common types of 
loans.  Banks must also submit this information to the BOT, 
which releases the rates and fees on its website in a format that 
allows consumers to compare prices across institutions.
17  To 
ensure consumer protection in banks’ consumer lending busi-
ness, the BOT limited to an aggregate rate of 28% the total in-
terest, fines, service charges, and other fees banks could charge 
on consumer loans.  Banks were also required to openly post on 
their website and in all branches the details of any such rates, 
fines, charges, and fees and respond promptly to consumer 
complaints regarding commercial loans.
18 
FSMP Phase II (2010-2014)
19 
Planning for Phase II of the FSMP began in 2007, when the 
BOT formed a committee of government and private sector 
representatives to conduct an interim review of Phase I.  The 
committee concluded that financial institution consolidation 
had resulted in enhanced risk management practices, contrib-
uted to efficiency gains, and created a more resilient financial 
system that offered a wider range of services.  However, it 
found that operating costs remained high, with Thailand’s aver-
age return on assets from 2004-2008 at 0.7%, lower than bank-
ing sectors in other regional economies.
20  The committee also 
identified gaps that remained in the provision of certain finan-
cial services, despite measures taken under Phase I.  A BOT 
survey noted, for example, that 20% of households continued to 
lack access to a bank account, 71% lacked access to bank lend-
ing, and nearly 10% of households lacked access to any type of 
financial service.
21  The committee further concluded that addi-
tional infrastructure developments were necessary to support 
stronger risk management at banks.  Recommendations for 
Phase II therefore focused on addressing these ongoing weak-
nesses by (i) reducing operating costs, (ii) continuing to pro-
mote competition and financial access, and (iii) strengthening 
financial infrastructure. 
Reduce System-Wide Operating Costs 
One type of cost targeted for reduction under the second phase 
of the FSMP stems from outdated regulation that is no longer 
consistent with financial institutions’ current business models.  
Although the BOT has yet to publicly identify specific regula-
tory reforms of this nature, it has sought the input of financial 
institutions and is working with the MOF to consider requests 
to amend certain regulations perceived to impose unnecessary 
costs.  Any reforms would necessarily keep the safety and 
soundness of the financial system as a high priority. 
A second source of costs derives from distressed assets that 
continue to weigh on Thailand’s financial system more than a 
decade after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Commercial banks 
have made significant progress in the resolution of non-
performing loans (NPLs), reducing the aggregate ratio of gross 
NPLs to total loans to 5.26% as of end-2008 from 42.90% a 
decade earlier.
22  The BOT’s implementation of stricter provi-
sioning requirements under IAS 39 has also assisted in the reso-
lution process by introducing greater transparency to bank bal-
ance sheets.  However, a variety of factors, including legal and 
tax disincentives, continue to discourage banks from resolving 
remaining NPLs.
23  To address legacy distressed assets, the 
BOT has stated that it will encourage banks to more aggres-
sively write off loans for which they have adequately provi-
sioned and will permit banks to work with private firms to cre-
ate markets for the trading of non-performing assets such as 
foreclosed real estate.  The BOT will also address some of the 
legal barriers to NPL resolution through measures to strengthen 
the financial infrastructure (see below). 
Promote Competition and Financial Access 
Measures to improve financial sector competitiveness primarily 
focus on allowing existing institutions to expand business ac-
tivities by relaxing restrictions on the operation and scope of 
commercial and retail banks as well as foreign branches and 
subsidiaries.  Indeed, the BOT has already begun moving in this 
direction by allowing commercial banks to gradually expand 
their product offerings to include leasing and hire-purchasing 
services, certain commodity-linked derivatives and hedging 
instruments, and other derivatives-related activities.
24  Proposed 
measures going forward include allowing commercial banks to 
expand into business lines—such as mutual fund and venture 
capital fund management—currently offered by their subsidiar-
ies.  Retail banks may also be permitted to upgrade to a com-
mercial bank license if they meet certain requirements, includ-
ing a minimum of THB 10 billion (USD 308 million) of Tier 1 
capital, and if financial regulators determine they possess strong 
management, good risk management systems and viable busi-
ness prospects that will not pose future systemic risks. 
Secondarily, the measures aim eventually to allow new market 
entrants.  Foreign branches may be permitted to upgrade to a 
foreign subsidiary license, and starting in 2012 new and exist-
ing foreign subsidiaries will become eligible to open up to 20 
new branches and 20 off-site ATMs.
25  To qualify for an expan-
sion, subsidiaries would need to have at least THB 10 billion 
(USD 308 million) in Tier 1 capital, good exam ratings from 
the BOT and a good risk management system.  Regulators hope 
that further expanding foreign banks’ presence will strengthen 
the competitiveness of domestic commercial banks.  Foreign 
branches will be permitted to open two additional branches 
starting in 2012, including currency exchange counters and 
automated teller machines ATMs.
26  After assessing the effects 
of these proposed reforms, Thailand will also consider permit-
ting the entry of new financial services providers to fill any 
remaining gaps in service. 
The BOT has also issued proposals to expand financial access 
to segments of the population that remain underserved after 
Phase I of the FSMP.  In addition to providing greater support 
to SFIs that already offer microfinance and other financial ser-
vices to rural, low-income households and small businesses, the 
BOT will encourage commercial banks to engage in microfi-
nance activities and consider new business lines that will facili-
tate these activities.  This could include establishing internal 
business units to specialize in lending to underserved custom-
ers, or partnerships with existing microfinance lenders to pro-
vide funds for lending.  The BOT and MOF will also consider 
on a case-by-case basis granting new, restricted, licenses to 
financial institutions such as microfinance service providers 
with expertise in the provision of financial services required to 
fill the gaps left by SFIs and commercial banks.
27 
 Strengthen Financial Infrastructure 
The BOT has identified areas of Thailand’s financial infrastruc-
ture that need improvement, primarily through directly or indi-
rectly strengthening risk management practices.  To address 
these areas, it has announced five sets of measures designed to: 
 Encourage banks to develop products and tools to enhance 
the management of credit, market, liquidity, and settlement 
risks. 
 Improve risk management information systems through a 
proposed expansion of information collection and distribu-
tion through the National Credit Bureau and its own distri-
bution channels.   
 Improve banks’ credit risk and management of non-
performing assets.  Initially, the BOT will review laws 
governing secured transactions, foreclosure and bankruptcy 
to ease the process for pledging collateral, streamline the 
foreclosure process, and ease access to the restructuring 
process for small businesses. 
 Encourage financial institutions to employ new technolo-
gies to better serve customer needs and reduce the cost of 
providing services. 
 Emphasize the need for financial institutions to attract and 
develop knowledgeable staff capable of strengthening cor-
porate governance and risk management.
28 
Conclusion 
Although it is somewhat difficult to evaluate the FSMP’s ulti-
mate impact giving its ongoing nature, the recent completion of 
Phase I has improved the architecture of Thailand’s financial 
sector.  Legal reforms, including those under the FIBA, have 
strengthened the country’s regulatory and supervisory frame-
work and addressed a number of deficiencies identified by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its recent Financial Sys-
tem Stability Assessment.
29  Phase I has also strengthened the 
competitiveness of domestic financial institutions by allowing 
greater foreign participation, a development welcomed by many 
domestic and foreign observers. 
The FSMP’s second phase aims to continue these positive de-
velopments.  A number of the proposed measures, such as ac-
celerated resolution of legacy NPLs, target areas identified by 
the IMF as immediate or medium-term priorities in its stability 
assessment.  Nevertheless, regulators in Thailand could face 
challenges going forward.  Some market participants have 
pointed out, for example, the potential difficulty of reconciling 
the push for new market entrants to fill service gaps or improve 
competition under Phase II with the efficiency gains achieved 
through consolidation under Phase I.  Concern has also been 
expressed that a growing international consensus on the need 
for stricter global bank regulation could make it difficult for 
Thai banks to reduce operating costs.
30  Thai banks may also 
face additional difficulties given the country’s ongoing political 
uncertainty.  Thus, while the latter phases of the FSMP are 
clearly aimed at further improving financial market infrastruc-
ture, these issues and the dynamic and ever changing global 
financial landscape will continue to challenge their implementa-
tion. 
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